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HIGHLIGHTS 
• We study the dynamics of prices in multiple equity market indices. 
• The decrease in stock prices (draw-downs) were identified as units of study. 
• A range of price differentials larger than a critical level conforms to a power law. 
• This level is interpreted as a phase transition into a self-organized system. 
 
ABSTRACT 
A methodology is developed to identify, as units of study, each decrease in the value of a 
stock from a given maximum price level. A critical level in the amount of price declines is found 
to separate a segment operating under a random walk from a segment operating under a 
power law. This level is interpreted as a point of phase transition into a self-organized system. 
Evidence of self-organization was found in all the stock market indices studied but in none of 
the control synthetic random series. Findings partially explain the fractal structure 
characteristic of financial time series and suggest that price fluctuations adopt two different 
operating regimes. We propose to identify downward movements larger than the critical level 
apparently subject to the power law, as self-organized states, and price decreases smaller than 
the critical level, as a random walk with the Markov property. 
 
Keywords: power law; heavy-tailed distribution; self-organization; Self Organized 
Criticality; critical point of phase transition. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The analytical-reductionist methodology that has traditionally addressed the description and 
study of stock market price fluctuations [9], [152], [69], [108], [109], [115], [39], [40], [120], 
[121], [102], [62] has left out of its scope of observation, therefore without explanation, some 
of the most interesting features of the phenomena since they don’t fit a normal Gaussian 
distribution and do not meet the principles of a Wiener-type random walk with the Markov 
property generated by supposedly rational agents as the unbiased aggregated response to the 
random flow of external information [96]. 
Instead of considering these characteristics as anomalies [31], [83], [122], we propose that 
heavy-tailed distributions [84], [85], the presence of clusters of high volatility alternating with 
periods of low volatility [123], [124], [38] [17], [97], the non-stationarity of statistical 
parameters [137], [93], [29], [68], the characteristic multifractal structure of stock market time 
series [112], [89], [20], [27], [75], [101], the recurring crises that stock markets have suffered 
since the seventeenth century [70], [134], and a fundamental instability inherent to financial 
markets [98] are structural processes that need to be addressed and explained instead of being 
swept under the rug. 
Several authors have tested the hypothesis that price fluctuations have short, medium and 
long-term memory [88], [54], [76], [77], [77], [72]. However, findings have been mixed, 
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especially for terms longer than a few hours or days. On the flip side, long-term memory has 
consistently been demonstrated in the volatility of time series [36], [17], [37]. 
This paper addresses price fluctuations with a systemic outlook to explain the alleged 
“anomalies” as emergent phenomena [3], [5], [6]. To this aim, recurrent downward movements 
of asset prices have been selected as observable units of study in a large sample of time series 
(30 cases) of equity market indices. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
A methodology was developed to identify in a series of daily closing prices each downward 
movement to a bottom from a recent peak, followed by a rebound back to the previous ceiling, 
or back to the highest value registered in the previous six months, whichever was reached first. 
These cumulative negative returns or downfalls then became units of study. Using the series of 
negative returns as observables, we explored the possibility of identifying a range within the 
space of states in which a variable that corresponded to the lowest value accumulated during 
each downfall could be explained as a process that follows a power law. 
Data sets of downfalls of 30 international equity market indices (7 regional international, 5 
American, 4 Latin American, 4 from emerging European countries, 5 from developed European 
countries and 5 from Asian countries) were ordered by size. The absolute value of each downfall 
(ordinates) was plotted against the place it occupied by size (abscissas) in a log-log scale. 
Kurtosis of the progressive sets of absolute downfalls of each index were calculated, 
anchoring each series at the smallest decrease in value. Increasingly larger absolute decreased 
values were incorporated one by one until the largest was reached. The level of the one decrease 
from which the set of downfalls smaller to it had a kurtosis closest to zero was identified as the 
cutoff point or critical level. The set of events with kurtosis closest to zero is thus compatible 
with a normal density distribution. 
The cutoff point was recognized as the critical level of phase transition separating two 
regimes of operation. The lower (mesokurtotic) segment of smaller price decreases, allegedly 
operating under a random regime, while the upper (leptokurtotic) segment of downfalls larger 
than the critical level can be explained as following a power law. This latter set of larger losses 
is incompatible with a normal density distribution. We propose to consider this set of larger 
declines in value purportedly generated by a process under a self-organized regime. 
 
3. Computation of parameters 
 
We obtained a time series of daily closing prices/values, ci, of each stock index from the 
earliest date available to us, c0, down to the most recent date at the time the study was made, cn 
(initial and final dates of each series are shown on Table 2). We then completed the following 
operations to estimate all the parameters used in this study: 
• Log returns ri, of price series were estimated with ri = ln(ci/ci−1). Standard deviations, Sr, 
were calculated as usual. Kurtosis, Kr, of daily returns were calculated as excess-kurtosis with… 
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…so the normal (mesokurtotic or Gaussian) value is 0. Larger values are considered leptokurtic 
or leptokurtotic [151]. The total number of log returns for each index are labeled Nr. 
• The set of daily values of the maximum closing price of the previous six months, cMax, 
was generated together with the closing price, ci, of every series (Figure 1, A and B). 
• We calculated a series of daily differences between ci − cMax to measure each decrease 
in value of the series ci below the series cMax. These differences also show the rebounding of ci 
back to the level of cMax. Series of values, di = ci − cMax, were generated (C in Figure 1). Each one 
of these movements is named a draw-down. A complete draw-down was considered as the set 
of negative values, di < 0, located between two alternating points where di = 0. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Nominal value of the S&P500 Index, ci, (A), the maximum closing level of the last 6 months, cMax, (B) (inferior 
panel, semi-log scale). Difference, ci − cMax, (C) (superior panel, arithmetic scale). 
 
• The most negative value of each di series (the bottom of every fall) was recorded (such 
di value was named dmax). For further analysis, the absolute value of each dmax is identified as an 
observable unit of study xi (Figure 2). The complete set of xi values for each index was Nx. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Difference between the daily nominal value of the S&P500 index compared to the maximum closing value of 
the previous 6 months ci −cMax. The arrows show how to identify the maximum value of a price drop dmax, followed 
by a complete recovery of the loss until it reaches back the reference value cMax. DD stands for draw-down. 
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• Maximum draw-down values, xi, were ordered from the largest, corresponding to the 
largest decline, xMax, to the smallest, corresponding to the shallowest decline, x0. 
• This generated a scatterplot of xi values (ordinates) against the cumulative place they 
occupied (abscissa) in a log-log scale (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scatterplot of individual price drops (dmax in absolute percentage value). Ordered from the deepest (largest) 
to the shallowest (smallest), in a log-log scale (critical data-point, xmin, in white). 
 
• Kurtosis, Kx, of the complete series of declines, xi, for each index was calculated. Also 
calculated were the kurtosis of the sets of cumulative values, Ks, anchored at xMax  down to x0. 
The same occurred with the sets of cumulative values, Ki, anchored at x0 up to xMax (see Table 1). 
• There followed an identification of the inferior segment of declines in value with a 
kurtosis value, Ki, closest to zero. This segment is thus considered mesokurtotic. The xi value at 
the cutoff point of this segment is labeled xmin from here on. 
• Kurtosis, Ks, of the superior segment (from xMax down to xmin) was also calculated. This 
segment was found to be leptokurtotic for all indices. The point of minimum fall, xmin, in this set, 
equivalent to the phase transition point, is the point at which the regime changes from being 
random (declines of less than xmin dimension) to a self-organizing regime (declines greater than 
xmin dimension), xmin being the critical level which separates them. 
• Declines with values ranging from xMax to xmin were selected and depicted on a log-log 
scale (log of the cumulative number of events against log of the size of the fall). A power 
regression line for this set of events was drawn and its coefficient of determination R2 was 
recorded (see Figure 4). The number of events in this set was labeled Ns. 
• The value of the exponent, α, of the regression and the value of the standard error of the 
exponent, σ, were calculated using the following formulas [106], [30]: 
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Figure 3.   MSCI Emerging Europe (Cum Price Drops)
 
 
Fig. 4. Segment of the complete set of xi falls (gray circles) in a log-log scale. Includes data from the deepest fall (xMax, 
in black), down to that fall at the critical point (xmin, in white). The power regression line, its formula and the R2 
Coefficient (inside the box), are included. 
 
The next 12 parameters were calculated for each one of the 30 stock market indices studied: 
• Total number of price decreases registered in the series, Nx. 
• Number of events (cases) in the upper segment, Ns. 
• Number of events (cases) in the lower segment, Ni. 
• Percentage that Ns represents of Nx. 
• Kurtosis, Kx, of the complete set of downward tendencies. 
• Kurtosis, Ks, of the upper (superior) downward tendencies. 
• Kurtosis, Ki, of the lower (inferior) downward tendencies. 
• Value of xMax. 
• Value of xmin. 
• R2 value of power regression line of upper set of downward tendencies. 
• Value of α exponent of power regression line. 
• Standard error, σ, of the α exponent of the power regression line. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 shows the most relevant results. The general characteristics of the financial time 
series (number of data for each series, standard deviation and kurtosis of daily log-returns, 
initial and final dates) appear in Table 2. The 30 stock market indices analyzed are briefly 
described in the Appendix. 
The method we used to identify each observation unit (each dip) yielded events whose 
amount depended on the length of history of the index in days of operation. The correlation 
coefficient between both quantities (days of operation vs. degree of loss registered) is 0.992 (R2 
= 0.945). The average number of losses registered in all 30 indexes is 323, with a minimum of 
111 for Colombia (2001-2015) and a maximum of 1,147 for the DJIA (1897-2015). The average 
proportion of events or downturns larger than the critical point is 23.68 % (ranging from 
15.95% to 32.20%). 
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Figure 4.   MSCI Emerging Europe (Cum Price Drops)
The average excess-kurtosis of the complete sets of price declines, Kx, (formula (1)) is 22.17 
(7.925 to 64.709). The average excess-kurtosis of the set of these declines above the critical 
point, Ks, is 6.029 (1.76 to 21.552) whereas the average excess-kurtosis of the inferior set of 
declines, Ki, is 0.001 (-0.295 to 0.151). 
The average value of the deepest loss, xMax, for all series is -55.91% (-38.91% to -77.62%). The 
average value of the loss at the critical point, xmin, is -4.46% (-1.73% to -8.70%) and the average 
coefficient of determination, R2, of the power regression is 0.9584 (0.9110 to 0.9834). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Values of the main measurements carried out to the time series of each market index are as follow: a) total 
number of drops registered [Ntot]; b) number of drops larger than the critical point xmin [Nsup]; c) number of drops 
smaller than the critical point xmin [Ninf]; d) percentage of drops larger than the critical point xmin as compared to the 
total number of drops [% Sup]; e) excess kurtosis of the complete set of drops [Ktot]; f) excess kurtosis of the set of 
drops larger than the critical point [Ksup]; g) excess kurtosis of the set of drops smaller than the critical point [Kinf]; 
h) largest drop xMax registered in each series [xMax]; i) critical point xmin in each series of drops [xmin]; j) coefficient of 
determination R2 of the power regression line for the set of drops larger than the critical point [R2]; k) exponent α of 
the power regression line [α]; l) standard error σ of the exponent of the power regression line [σ]. 
 
It was considered incorrect to estimate the scaling exponent using the power regression line 
adjustment because, as Goldstein et al [53] highlighted, this procedure is systematically biased 
and induces errors; hence, it is not reliable. The method Newman [106] and Clauset [30] 
proposed was used instead. The formulas are annotated at number 11 of Computation of 
a b c d e f g h i j k l
N tot N sup N inf % Sup K tot K sup K inf x Max x min R
2  α s
MSCI ACWI 295 57 238 19.32% 39.276 12.174 0.053 -50.99% -3.27% 0.9744 2.200 0.162
MSCI WI 326 79 247 24.23% 40.576 15.989 0.045 -49.54% -3.36% 0.9666 2.171 0.132
EM EUROPE 145 39 106 26.90% 12.890 4.408 0.049 -73.80% -6.92% 0.9528 2.207 0.193
EM ASIA 259 59 200 22.78% 23.506 6.084 -0.005 -61.00% -2.48% 0.9686 2.864 0.192
EM LATAM 267 71 196 26.59% 16.447 3.898 0.021 -68.08% -4.32% 0.9381 2.087 0.129
EuroStox 50 139 34 105 24.46% 18.379 3.363 -0.013 -46.24% -4.16% 0.9698 2.320 0.226
StoxxEuro 600 358 72 286 20.11% 28.189 4.984 -0.016 -43.66% -2.55% 0.9635 2.079 0.127
S&P500 696 170 526 24.43% 31.442 12.022 -0.002 -46.91% -2.81% 0.9808 2.393 0.107
WILSHIRE 5K 240 69 171 28.75% 64.709 21.552 0.151 -56.64% -1.73% 0.9712 2.103 0.133
DJIA 1147 266 881 23.19% 22.962 6.327 -0.003 -53.57% -3.12% 0.9471 2.147 0.070
NASDAQ C. 452 105 347 23.23% 28.815 9.108 0.086 -54.99% -3.37% 0.9659 2.172 0.114
RUSSELL 2K 263 54 209 20.53% 21.868 4.508 0.008 -54.93% -4.28% 0.9659 2.226 0.167
FRANCE 247 58 189 23.48% 17.583 3.656 0.037 -43.38% -4.61% 0.9683 2.372 0.180
GERMANY 525 125 400 23.81% 22.209 5.636 -0.003 -51.70% -3.61% 0.9583 2.249 0.112
ITALY 172 51 121 29.65% 11.915 2.208 -0.004 -56.09% -3.31% 0.9242 1.959 0.134
U. KINGDOM 257 41 216 15.95% 19.506 3.666 -0.036 -39.59% -5.48% 0.9766 2.607 0.251
SWITZERLAND 266 54 212 20.30% 20.637 2.939 -0.295 -41.01% -3.62% 0.9567 2.269 0.173
JAPAN 436 91 345 20.87% 21.945 4.107 -0.002 -50.94% -3.38% 0.9834 2.211 0.127
HONG KONG 408 100 308 24.51% 18.655 5.125 -0.001 -72.14% -5.50% 0.9607 2.258 0.126
AUSTRALIA 359 83 276 23.12% 31.418 10.688 0.005 -50.09% -3.01% 0.9582 2.187 0.130
TAIWAN 432 93 339 21.53% 19.634 4.747 -0.037 -73.64% -5.26% 0.9436 2.140 0.118
INDIA 282 73 209 25.89% 11.177 3.094 0.008 -52.02% -6.18% 0.9607 2.439 0.168
RUSSIA 138 37 101 26.81% 12.884 4.901 0.005 -76.83% -8.09% 0.9692 2.158 0.190
TURKEY 236 76 160 32.20% 7.925 1.869 0.054 -59.13% -5.70% 0.9110 2.048 0.120
HUNGARY 172 41 131 23.84% 12.561 2.719 0.020 -58.16% -5.69% 0.9464 2.108 0.173
POLAND 199 50 149 25.13% 16.833 5.537 -0.008 -67.57% -5.62% 0.9551 2.254 0.177
MEXICO 439 98 341 22.32% 28.136 7.953 -0.042 -77.62% -4.78% 0.9749 2.240 0.125
BRAZIL 226 38 188 16.81% 18.380 2.815 -0.003 -61.42% -8.70% 0.9435 2.470 0.238
CHILE 202 64 138 31.68% 12.083 3.023 0.006 -38.91% -2.12% 0.9376 1.963 0.120
COLOMBIA 111 20 91 18.02% 12.530 1.760 -0.042 -46.78% -6.75% 0.9584 2.257 0.281
AVERAGE 323 76 248 23.68% 22.169 6.029 0.001 -55.91% -4.46% 0.9584 2.239 0.157
MAX 1147 266 881 32.20% 64.709 21.552 0.151 -38.91% -1.73% 0.9834 2.864 0.281
MIN 111 20 91 15.95% 7.925 1.760 -0.295 -77.62% -8.70% 0.9110 1.959 0.070
N tot N sup N inf % Sup K tot K sup K inf x Max x min R
2  α s
Table 1.
Parameters as in formulas (2) and (3). The average value of the α exponent is 2.239 (1.959 to 
2.864), and the standard error of that exponent is, on average, 0.157 (0.070 to 0.281). 
Excess kurtosis of the set of downward tendencies smaller than the critical level (not included 
in Figure 4) is approximately zero (actual values of all series are depicted on Table 1, col. g), 
while the density distribution of the set of values larger than the critical level included in the 
graph corresponds to the leptokurtic segment (Table 1, col. f). 
Figure 5 shows the critical level, xmin, of each index by groups: regional indices, USA indices, 
Emerging Markets Europe, Developed Countries Europe, Latin America Markets and Asia 
Markets. Note that Latin America indices are the most disperse while the USA and Developed 
Europe indices have the least disperse values. Furthermore, the average value of the critical 
point is more negative for the Latin America indices (-5.58%) and Emerging Europe (-6.27%), 
is intermediate for the Asia indices (-4.466%) and Developed Europe (-4.12%) and is less 
negative for the Regional indices (-3.86%) and the USA indices (-3.062%). This may be related 
to the degree of efficiency (randomness) of the series, and should be addressed. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Level of those price drops, xmin, that identify the critical point of the grouped indexes in Regional [REGIONAL 
= 7] USA indexes [USA = 5], Emerging Europe [EM EUROPE= 4], Developed Europe [DEV. EUROPE = 5], Latin America 
indexes [EM LATAM = 4], Asian Markets indexes [ASIA = 5]. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The task of explaining and modeling price fluctuations in financial markets, one of the most 
complex phenomena we can imagine, has been challenging. It was bravely undertaken by giants 
with the stature of Bachelier, Working, Savage, Marschak, Samuelson, Sharpe and others [9], 
[152], [45], [96], [108], [115], [120]. With a reductionist view, based on strongly restrictive and 
unrealistic assumptions, their work, however, fell on fertile soil whose fruits could be harvested 
in abundance throughout the second half of the 20th century, creating a theoretical framework 
that is elegant, pure, beautiful, timeless and balanced. Nevertheless, in addition to other authors 
[138], [117], [73], [149], [77], [126], [25], [63], [127], [128], [51], [113], [65], [66], [67], [146], 
[147], [129], [130], [142], [143], [144], [145], [125], [52], [78], [48], [1], [55], [56], [64], [119], 
we believe the time has come to liberate most of those assumptions and to get closer to the 
phenomenon as it is: organic, dynamic, unstable, rough, discontinuous, partially self-generated 
and diffuse. Perhaps the state of affairs today is too complex for that old model. 
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Figure 5.  Critical Point (xmin) by Index Group
  
 
Table 2. Nr = Total number of daily log-returns of each original series. Sr = Standard Deviation of total daily log-
returns of each original series. Kr = Kurtosis of total daily log-returns of each original series. First Date, date of the 
first data in the series, corresponds to c0 of the series ci. Last Date, date of the last data in the series, corresponds to 
cn of the series ci. 
 
The fact that the financial world is in a permanent state of innovation and conceivably 
complexification, it is also inherent in its nature to undergo recurrent crises of endogenous 
origin that should be faced once and for all. Concepts such as holism, entropy, dissipative 
systems, unbalanced states, self-organization, positive feedback loops and non-linearity, 
characteristics of the complexity approach, have been gradually introduced into the theoretical 
discourse of economics and finance [3], [7], [5], [6], [58], [60], [44], [22], [15], [107], [135], 
[154]. These concepts offer useful alternatives which may allow us to liberate restrictions that 
are not only unbelievable but sometimes rather absurd. Perfect rationality of economic agents, 
a selfish interest in maximizing personal utility, and the supposed homogeneity of expectations 
are just a few examples of assumptions that might hinder the progress in this field. 
a b c d e
N r S r K r First Date Last Date
MSCI ACWI 7,058 0.909% 8.374 1/3/1988 3/13/2015
MSCI WI 7,748 0.923% 11.334 6/10/1985 3/13/2015
EM EUROPE 4,974 1.886% 10.597 1/2/1995 3/13/2015
EM ASIA 7,088 1.291% 6.583 12/31/1987 3/13/2015
EM LATAM 4,126 1.717% 9.268 1/1/1988 2/26/2015
EuroStox 50 4,126 1.504% 4.348 1/22/1999 3/13/2015
StoxxEuro 600 7,268 1.115% 7.156 12/31/1986 3/13/2015
S&P500 16,418 0.970% 27.675 1/3/1950 4/6/2015
WILSHIRE 5K 6,526 1.121% 8.805 3/31/1989 2/26/2015
DJIA 32,180 1.097% 31.420 02/01/1897 3/4/2015
NASDAQ C. 11,139 1.240% 9.888 2/5/1971 4/7/2015
RUSSELL 2K 6,949 1.317% 8.640 9/10/1987 4/7/2015
FRANCE 4,126 1.401% 5.288 7/9/1987 3/17/2015
GERMANY 13,941 1.229% 7.620 10/1/1959 3/16/2015
ITALY 6,410 1.456% 5.248 12/29/1989 4/7/2015
U. KINGDOM 7,821 1.102% 8.447 4/2/1984 3/17/2015
SWITZERLAND 6,725 1.166% 7.777 7/1/1988 4/7/2015
JAPAN 10,541 1.304% 10.072 1/5/1970 3/18/2015
HONG KONG 11,181 1.875% 30.253 12/1/1969 4/2/2015
AUSTRALIA 8,916 0.990% 85.615 12/31/1979 4/7/2015
TAIWAN 13,251 1.549% 3.015 1/4/1967 4/7/2015
INDIA 8,213 1.651% 5.891 4/3/1979 4/7/2015
RUSSIA 4,377 2.754% 14.496 9/22/1997 4/7/2015
TURKEY 6,574 2.717% 4.096 1/4/1988 4/7/2015
HUNGARY 6,053 1.663% 10.941 1/2/1991 4/7/2015
POLAND 5,524 1.922% 7.438 4/16/1991 4/7/2015
MEXICO 10,027 1.727% 20.468 1/3/1975 3/5/2015
BRASIL 5,432 2.367% 10.182 4/14/1993 4/2/2015
CHILE 6,304 0.817% 6.818 1/2/1990 4/2/2015
COLOMBIA 3,362 1.329% 12.488 7/3/2001 4/9/2015
AVERAGE 8,479 1.470% 13.341
MAX 32,180 2.754% 85.615
MIN 3,362 0.817% 3.015
N r S r K r First Date Last Date
Table 2.
Doubtlessly the behavioral patterns at the level of each agent that makes decisions is 
important; however, it is insufficient to explain the aggregated result or the supposedly 
coordinated activity of all participants, each one with his or her own peculiarities, while sharing 
a place and a role in the same system at the same time. Modeling the stock market phenomena, 
we seek to build a bridge from the micro-level, i.e. from the clever but fallible single agent, with 
relatively simple and rather stereotypical strategies, responsible for the input that goes into the 
system (trading in the marketplace), to the output observed at the macro level, that is, price 
fluctuations with their stylized characteristics. 
We consider such an output to be the result not only of the cumulative effect of the parts, 
likewise as something richer and more organic, i.e., something that confers novel properties on 
the system. From a systemic perspective, that “something” we propose may be called emergent 
properties. 
New paths recently explored to model the stock markets are related to two main branches: 
A) The identification and description of the stylized micro-structure of financial time series and 
the fractal properties of such series and B) Agent-Based Simulations create synthetic markets 
that follow the seminal segregation model of Thomas Schelling [118]. The pioneering work of 
Benôit Madelbrot excels in the field of fractality, together with a mounting group of authors 
devoted to it [89], [112], [92], [93], [149], [136], [91], [8], [27], [2], [68], [27], [12], [71], [18], 
[23], [99], [100], [134], [103], [104], [114], [101]. Through the creation of stock market 
simulations, individual agents are given heterogeneous characteristics and allowed to freely 
interact in a synthetic environment. These interactions reliably generate price fluctuations 
portraying the stylized characteristics found in real life markets [59], [7], [110], [80], [42], [43], 
[50], [35], [74], [141], [81], [61], [43]. 
 
6. The power law and self-organization 
 
In an attempt to relate the heavy-tailed distribution with the fractal properties of price 
fluctuations, the clusters of high volatility, the capacity of self-organization and the emergent 
properties of complex adaptive systems, we explored the possibility of finding a distribution 
form known as Power Law or Zipf’s Law in the deepest fluctuations or tails of falling prices 
given the ubiquity of this kind of distribution in phenomena with statistical properties such as 
those found in financial time series [150]. 
In 1949, the American philologist George Zipf discovered that when the American 
corporations listed on the stock market were ordered by size (market capitalization value), the 
size Sn of the na largest company was inversely proportional to the place it occupied in the series 
in an approximate way to the form Sn  1/na. 
Previously, Zipf had found that the frequency distribution of words in a text followed the same 
rule [155]. Nowadays this distribution form is known as the Zipf’s Law. Half a century before 
Zipf’s publication (in 1949), the Italian engineer, sociologist, philosopher and economist 
Vilfredo Pareto, described a pattern known as tail function, applicable to several social and 
physical phenomena whose cumulative distribution function of continuous variables can’t be 
distinguished from Zipf’s proposal for discrete ones [111]. Another of the few differences 
between Zipf’s and Pareto’s proposals is that Zipf did his graphs with the x value (the measured 
variable) on the horizontal axis and the probability of appearance P(x) on the vertical axis, while 
Pareto did it the other way around. The latter is the way we do it in this paper. 
Zip’s Law is a special case of the Pareto distribution. Both forms of distribution have 
interesting statistical properties to be contrasted with our results. Firstly, the heavy tails 
distribution reflected the leptokurtic distribution, notable in all time-series studied here (Table 
1, column f). It is said that these processes are dependent on the Power Law because the 
probability of obtaining a specific value in any investigated parameter varies inversely as the 
exponent of such value. 
The phenomena that have these properties are not properly represented by a typical value or 
arithmetic average because the extreme cases can deviate from the media by several orders of 
magnitude [106], [30]. Examples of natural and social phenomena with this property are the 
distribution of wealth among members of a community [111], [21], [26], the Gutenberg-Richter 
Law of frequency of occurrence and intensity of earthquakes [57], the intensity of solar flares 
[79], the size and frequency of moon craters [105], the size of cities as to number of inhabitants 
and to their frequency [47], the formation of random networks of several kinds [14], and many 
others [94]. 
It is alerted that very few forms of distribution of real world phenomena follow the Power 
Law in the complete range of values that they may adopt, particularly for small values of the 
measured variable. In fact, for any positive value of exponent α, the function p(x) = Cxα diverges 
as x tends to zero. Therefore, the distribution must deviate from the form of the Power Law 
under a certain minimum value xmin. The form of the Power Law appears as a straight line only 
for values greater than xmin [106]. 
From a geometrical perspective, a phenomenon organized under the Power Law has fractal 
properties, that is, within a certain range of values there is self-similarity at different scales; 
hence it is said that they have scale invariance. It is characteristic of price fluctuations that the 
extreme events lack a scale or typical value around which the individual cases are concentrated 
in their magnitude and duration. Generally, this is a consequence of the central limit theorem 
for processes free of scale in which a Levy random walk replaces the Brownian movement [19]. 
In this paper, we have found an inverse relation between the size of price decreases and their 
frequency of presentation through their exponents in such a way that, if a graph is built of such 
relationships on an arithmetic scale, the distribution adopts a curve in the shape of “J”, which 
approaches both orthogonal axes asymptotically. When the graph is made on a log-log scale, the 
distribution forms a straight line with a negative slope. In both cases, all segments of the curve 
are similar if they are represented in the proper scale. 
How come an earthquake, the size of moon craters, the human dwellers in a city or the 
accumulation of wealth in a family are related to price reductions in the stock market? And, why 
should they have similar statistical and geometrical properties? 
As Sornette and Cauwles suggest, maybe the kind of phenomena that behave in this way can 
have catastrophic results, apparently detonated by trivial exogenous events that occasionally 
reach a tipping point since during the phases of apparent equilibrium and tranquility, the 
necessary conditions for the so-called avalanche, accumulate. For such a feared outcome to 
happen, a critical value in state variables must be reached before the phenomena self-organize 
and change their regime [135]. The proverbial straw that breaks the camel back is an example 
in which, after a paused and peaceful process and almost without warning, some relevant 
variable reaches a critical level and manifests as a crisis in the form known as a crossover or 
bifurcation. 
In the case of decreased prices in the stock market, while the system is still under the random 
regime, small changes generated by the response of some investors to exogenous information, 
perceived as negative, are easily absorbed by the contingent of optimistic participants who may 
be analyzing the same information but in a longer (or shorter) time frame. Perhaps they 
conclude that the recent descent in prices creates a favorable condition to increase their 
positions. However, if the downhill movement of prices continues, the sequence of successive 
perturbations increases the tension generated in the system following new small downward 
impulses. At a certain point, the pressure upon the contingent of buyers eventually overrides 
their capacity to absorb the increasing bidding until a further decrease in prices generates a 
change of regime (bifurcation) in which rather than buyers, new sellers who wish to get rid of 
their positions to stop their growing losses are attracted. Thus, a positive feedback loop is built:  
lowered prices attract more sellers whose bidding presses prices downwards in a vicious circle 
that generates a selling crisis characteristic of a market sell-off. 
Furthermore, as prices continue to fall, the process could be accelerated as the mandatory 
selling of positions reaches a threshold in the form of margin-calls, or due to risk management 
criteria, which trigger stop loss signals. These two possibilities are clear examples of positive 
feedback mechanisms capable of accentuating the lowering of prices with total disregard to 
exogenous information or to disparities of the market price with the supposed intrinsic value 
of assets anticipated by the efficient market hypothesis. Instead, a self-organized system that 
activates the reinforcement of price trends emerges. It is precisely this self-organized 
phenomenon in a regime, which reinforces itself that we believe is happening during the phase 
of dropping prices that are larger than the critical point identified in our model as xmin. 
There is an endogenous process resulting from an internal re-structuring which depends on 
the new relationship among agents conforming the system and their answers to information 
derived from the system itself. This expression of the phenomena is an intimate arrangement 
in the balance of perturbing and repairing forces, or, using systemic language, the homeostatic 
mechanisms are surpassed in such a way that the system adopts a new regime that instead of 
being a stabilizer of its output it becomes an amplifier. 
From a mathematical point of view, this observation is not a surprise. It can be understood as 
the generic behavior of a dynamic system. In accordance with the general theorems of the 
bifurcation theory, there is only a finite number of ways in which a system can change its 
regime; it is a change that happens suddenly, not progressively [135]. 
In his excellent review of the subject, Mark Newman from The University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, discusses the statistical distribution of the Power Law and describes several mechanisms 
proposed to explain its occurrence. These include: 1) the mechanism known as highly optimized 
tolerance (HOT) of Carlson and Doyle, 2) the Sneppen and Newman mechanism focused on the 
behavior of agents under stress, 3) the process of Udly Yule in critical phenomena and 4), the 
concept of a self-organized critical state anticipated by Per Bak [106]. 
The Highly-Optimized Tolerance of Carlson and Doyle [28] proposes that in natural and in 
human systems organized to offer a robust performance, regardless of the uncertainties in the 
environment, an exchange is generated among the revenue, the cost of the resources and the 
tolerance to risk, which leads to highly optimized designs that are predisposed to sporadic 
events of great magnitude. The main characteristics of the systems in a HOT state include: 1) 
high efficiency performance and robustness to uncertainties to which they are designed, 2) 
hypersensitivity to design flaws or unforeseen perturbations, 3) structurally, not generic, 
specialized configurations, and 4) being subject to the Power Law. Classic examples are forest 
fires and other phenomena based on the percolation model [28]. 
Another mechanism, mathematically equivalent to that of Carlson and Doyle’s, is coherent 
noise, proposed by Sneppen and Newman. In this mechanism, a certain number of agents or 
species are subject to stress of different kinds for which each agent has a threshold. Above that 
level of stress, the agent will be eliminated, or the species will be extinguished. Extinct species 
are replaced by new species with stress thresholds randomly selected. The net result is a system 
that self-organizes to a final state where many of the species will have high levels of stress 
tolerance. This type of phenomenon shows reorganization events whose size is distributed in 
accordance to the Power Law through many decades. Additionally, the system shows after-
shock events with the same distribution. The authors propose that under the action of a slow 
local force, some systems with short-range interactions may organize to a critical state without 
needing to fine tune some parameters [131]. 
The Yule process is a mechanism known as “the rich get richer” or Gibrat’s Law, a principle of 
cumulative advantage or preferential selection. Here, an alternative that occupies a prominent 
place as a possible choice will have a higher probability of being chosen; thus, it will have an 
amplifying effect mathematically demonstrated as a Power Law distribution in its tail [106], 
[153].  This mechanism is probably adequate to explain that the size of companies and their 
frequency in a market, the frequency of words in a text or the number of assets a family 
possesses, show a heavy tailed distribution and follow the Power Law. However, to explain the 
processes that determine that a price drop of stock assets which surpasses a certain critical 
level extends the descent in a self-organized form with characteristics such as those shown in 
this paper, we prefer the method described by Per Bak, that is, a self-organization to a critical 
state or Self Organized Criticality [11]. 
According to this model, when the falling prices reach a critical level, a progressive 
recruitment of sellers who try to limit their losses by getting rid of their positions starts. Each 
agent will have his/her own pre-existing conditions (or “schema”, as Murray Gell-Mann tags 
them [49]), such as exposure to the market, previous accumulated returns, degree of exposure 
and risk control policies and tolerance or aversion to risk, that will determine the threshold 
level necessary to reach before triggering a selling process. Under Self Organized Criticality, the 
reaction of sellers is triggered independently of the exogenous information delivered at that 
moment and of the previous expectations agents have. Instead, it will be determined solely by 
the endogenous information derived from a price fall of certain magnitude. Once this critical 
point is reached, the system diverges from its previous trajectory and begins a different 
dynamic process, as Balcilar et al. have suggested in relation to the herd behavior [13]. 
Bouchaud has suggested that this erratic dynamic of the markets is mainly of endogenous 
origin. He attributes this to a market that operates in a regime of manifest evanescent liquidity, 
but, at the same time, high latent liquidity, which explains its hypersensitivity to fluctuations 
and identifies a dangerous positive feedback loop arranged by the spread in prices of supply 
(bid) and demand (ask) and volatility that may lead to a crisis of micro-liquidity and huge jumps 
in prices [24]. 
 
7. Practical applications 
 
We propose four ways in which these concepts may be directly applied to the practice of 
finance. First, Zipf’s distribution in the size of companies has an important consequence in 
building alleged efficient portfolios [95] given the impossibility of making an adequate 
diversification of specific risk when there is dominance of some small number of companies of 
great size (capitalization) in a market. Therefore, its effect in the supposed “market portfolio” 
can’t be diversified even if the total number of companies included in the sample is large. This 
is considered a particular risk factor named Zipf’s factor [82]. 
Second, it is possible to explain the phases of high volatility as an emergent process that 
results from a regime in which agents’ expectations diverge about their returns on investments, 
or about the target prices of assets. In other words, their beliefs are dispersed in an exaggerated 
way compared with the baseline heterogeneity typically observed under normal circumstances. 
At the same time, the dispersion in the timeframe adopted to observe, analyze and react to 
exogenous and endogenous events, becomes more homogeneous. We suggest that as the 
timeframes in which agents make decisions become shorter and more homogeneous, and as 
their expectations become more heterogeneous and disperse, the market becomes less stable 
and more vulnerable to both endogenous and exogenous perturbations. We still have to design 
the appropriate tests to identify these characteristics in empirical series or replicate these 
mechanisms with agent-based simulation models to prove our suggestion. 
Third, as proposed by Sornette and Scheffer, as we better understand the way in which 
markets self-organize in successive layers, and how the downfalls in prices are generated, we 
may recognize the mechanisms that determine the avalanches, develop indicators that allow us 
to evaluate their presence, find early signs that the system is reaching a critical level of phase 
transition and, perhaps, mitigate the local or general effects of the disruptive process [132], 
[133], [116]. 
And last, having found that the exponent of the regression line of the tails is smaller than 3 
(media of 2.239 and range from 1.959 to 2.864), we can predict the probability and magnitude 
of large negative fluctuations observed in capital markets once the threshold or critical point is 
exceeded. We are currently developing this methodology. 
It could be that from the rich interaction among components of the system, and the non-linear 
processes they generate, an inherently unpredictable dynamism results. However, what could 
interest us is predicting the big bifurcations or breaking points towards extreme events 
happening when critical levels are surpassed in a set of parameters from which an explosion to 
the infinite is conveyed upon a usually stable variable. We need to investigate how patterns of 
great scale and catastrophic nature evolve; we suppose there are growing levels of auto-
correlation of the relevant variables, formed from processes occurring on a smaller scale. The 
critical points identified in the present paper suggest the possibility that, on a larger scale, other 
events that better explain the great stock market breakdowns may be identified. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we design a new model that may explain price fluctuations as a process with 
heavy tails distribution that follows a Power Law. We assume a non-stationary phenomenon 
with periods of high volatility alternating with others of low volatility. To this end, we have 
considered the statistical and geometric properties of financial time series as emergent 
phenomena resulting from the joint activity and interaction of autonomous agents, 
heterogeneous in many aspects, operating in an unstable, high complexity context and resulting 
in the appearance of trends in price fluctuations and distortions towards extreme states. 
We have developed a method to identify the critical point of phase transition in which the 
random regime proposed by the classical paradigm gives way to a self-organized regime. We 
have found that the downward movements of prices may be explained as alternating states 
between periods compatible with a random walk with i.i.d. properties, and periods subject to a 
self-organized emergent regime that may explain the presence of heavy tails.  
Specifically, we have identified that price drops that go deeper than a critical point may be 
represented as a phenomenon under the Power Law. From this characteristic identified we 
have made a tentative explanation of how it is generated and what potential consequences such 
a proposed mechanism may produce to generate a phenomenon with the demonstrated 
statistical and geometrical characteristics observed. This may explain, at least partially, the 
fractal structure with self-affinity and scale invariance observed in financial time series. 
Our findings suggest the presence of medium-term memory, tentatively due to the effect of 
positive feedback loops [4] which also identify a probable generation mechanism of clusters 
with high volatility. We propose to identify descendent movements subject to the Power Law 
as self-organized states of the kind described by Per Bak as Self-Organized Criticality [10], [11], 
[46]. 
Upon the bases established in this paper, we need to define a mechanism for estimating the 
probability of occurrence of decreases in stock prices larger than the critical point, through the 
definition of the proper characteristics of each series. This would result in the first practical 
application of these new concepts. 
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Appendix  
 
The 30 indexes investigated are as follows: 
 
• MSCI ACWI (Morgan Stanley Capital International All Countries World Index) includes shares of 
2,446 firms from 46 countries and captures returns in 23 Developed Economies and 23 Emerging 
Markets countries. It represents all economic sectors worldwide. 
• MSCI WI (Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index), includes shares of 1,613 firms from 
23 Developed Economy countries. It represents all economic sectors. 
• MSCI EM EUROPE (MSCI Emerging Markets Europe Index) captures representation across 6 
Emerging Markets countries from Europe (Russia, Turkey, Poland, Greece, Hungary, Czech 
Republic). It has 84 constituents. 
• MSCI EM ASIA (MSCI Emerging Markets Asia Index) represents 534 firms from 8 Emerging Market 
countries from Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and 
Thailand). 
• MSCI EM LATAM (MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index) with 118 constituents from 5 
Emerging Markets countries from Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru). 
• Stoxx Europe 600 represents 600 components of large, mid and small capitalization companies 
across 18 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 
• Euro Stoxx 50, the leading blue-chip index from the Eurozone, covers 50 stocks from 12 countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain). 
• CAC 40 Index, France (40 stocks) 
• FTSE 100 Index, Great Britain (100 stocks) 
• DAX Index, Germany (30 stocks) 
• FTSE MIB Index, Italy (40 stocks) 
• Swiss Market Index, Switzerland (20 stocks) 
• MICEX Index, Russia (50 stocks) 
• BISE National 100 Index, Turkey (100 stocks) 
• BSE Index, Hungary (13 stocks) 
• WIG Index, Poland (342 stocks) 
• S&P500 (500 stocks, Large-Caps, USA) 
• DJIA (30 stocks, Large-Caps, USA) 
• NASDAQ Composite (2,976 stocks, USA) 
• Russell 2000 (2000 stocks, Small-Caps, USA) 
• Wilshire 5000 Index (3,698 stocks, USA) 
• IPC, Mexico (35 stocks) 
• BOVESPA, Brazil (71 stocks) 
• IGPA, Chile (102 stocks) 
• IGBC, Colombia (34 stocks) 
• NIKKEI 225, Japan (225 stocks) 
• HANG SENG, Hong Kong (50 stocks) 
• All Ordinaries Index, Australia (498 stocks) 
• TAIEX Index, Taiwan (786 stocks) 
• S&P BSE SENSEX Index, India (30 stocks) 
 
